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Offenders with psychopathy have often committed crimes violating social norms, which
may suggest a biased moral reasoning in psychopathy. Yet, as findings on utilitarian
decisions remain conflicting, the current study investigated different aspects of fairness
considerations in offenders with psychopathy, offenders without psychopathy and healthy
individuals (N = 18/14/18, respectively). Unfair offers in a modified Ultimatum Game
(UG) were paired with different unselected alternatives, thereby establishing the context
of a proposal, and made under opposing intentionality constraints (intentional vs.
unintentional). As in previous studies, unfair offers were most often rejected when the
alternative was fair and when the offer was made intentionally. Importantly, however,
offenders with psychopathy demonstrated a similar rejection pattern to that of healthy
individuals, i.e., taking the unselected alternative into account. In contrast, delinquents
without psychopathy did not adjust their decision behavior to the alternatives to an offer,
suggesting stronger impairments in social decision-making. Crucially, the mechanisms and
processes underlying rejection decisions might differ, particularly with regard to cognitive
vs. emotional competencies. While preserved cognitive perspective-taking could drive
seemingly intact decision patterns in psychopathy, emotional empathy is likely to be
compromised.
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INTRODUCTION
Social deficits are evident in various psychiatric disorders with
their expression ranging from withdrawal in e.g., social pho-
bia to antisocial behavior and even social predation as observed
in psychopathy. Offenders with psychopathy often show a his-
tory of serious violent crimes committed against another person
(i.e., murder, rape) and increased recidivism of criminal behav-
ior (D’Silva et al., 2004) that exceeds the relapse rate of offenders
without psychopathy by a factor of up to four (Harris et al., 1991;
Hemphill et al., 1998).
The initial concept of psychopaths as “moral imbeciles”
(Maudsley, 1895) attributed their deviations to a decreased abil-
ity for moral reasoning. Indeed, core traits of psychopathy such
as manipulative behavior, callousness, and lack of guilt/remorse
have been associated with overlooking moral principles for non-
moral incentives such as money as well as a negative appreciation
of the moral values of fairness and harm prevention (Glenn
et al., 2009). In order to target the cognitive component of
morality, hypothetical moral dilemmas that assess decisive judg-
ments, e.g., how “appropriate” an action in the given situation
is or whether one would execute that action, are frequently used
(Greene et al., 2001). Although offenders with psychopathy tend
to maximize overall benefit in these scenarios, i.e., demonstrate
utilitarian choice patterns (Koenigs et al., 2012), there is no con-
sistent evidence that individuals with psychopathy differ from
healthy groups in explicit moral judgments (Blair et al., 1995;
Cima et al., 2010; Aharoni et al., 2012). Findings on differences
in moral reasoning between incarcerated populations with and
without psychopathy are similarly inconsistent (Cima et al., 2010;
Koenigs et al., 2012) and a recent meta-analysis reported a neg-
ative relation between moral development and recidivism for
offenders in general, irrespective of psychopathic traits (Van Vugt
et al., 2011). It therefore remains important to compare individ-
uals with psychopathy not only to a healthy, but also to another
forensic reference group which has also been convicted for serious
offenses that essentially violate social and moral norms.
In contrast to hypothetical scenarios, an association between
psychopathic traits and an increased focus on self-interest has
been derived from social decision-making paradigms (Rilling
et al., 2007; Mokros et al., 2008; Koenigs et al., 2010; Osumi and
Ohira, 2010). Economic games, such as the Ultimatum Game
(UG; Güth et al., 1982), are frequently used to capture strate-
gies in interpersonal settings that involve weighting self-interest
and other-interest. Here, the first player proposes a split of a
resource, which can be either accepted or rejected by the sec-
ond player (responder). Acceptance implements the proposal, but
rejection leaves both players with nothing. Instead of “rationally”
maximizing their payoff by accepting anything, responders fre-
quently reject unfair offers, which has been attributed to fairness
considerations (Güth et al., 1982).
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In individuals with psychopathic traits, the observed disre-
gard for fairness norms (Glenn et al., 2009; Aharoni et al., 2011)
is mirrored in altered responder behavior in the UG, although
the findings remain conflicting. On the one hand, students scor-
ing high on psychopathic traits displayed lower rejection rates
of unfair offers, interpreted as favoring self-interest (Osumi and
Ohira, 2010). On the other hand, incarcerated patients with psy-
chopathy showed the opposite pattern: individuals with primary
psychopathy, i.e., psychopathy with low trait anxiety, rejected
more unfair offers relative to individuals with secondary psy-
chopathy or without psychopathy, which the authors relate to
deficits in regulating anger and frustration (Koenigs et al., 2010).
A recently published study found similar rejection behavior in
participants with high and low psychopathic tendencies and sug-
gests different underlying decision mechanisms, i.e., rejection as
a reaction to frustration in individuals scoring high on psycho-
pathic traits (Vieira et al., 2013).
As the classic UG assesses outcome-based fairness consid-
erations, i.e., a comparison of outcomes of the self and the
other (Radke et al., 2012), without an explicit normative ref-
erence point, it remains unresolved which factors underlie the
deviations in social decision-making. Along these lines, previous
results on psychopathy and UG decisions (Koenigs et al., 2010;
Osumi and Ohira, 2010) can only be interpreted on the basis of
outcome-driven judgments, but not in terms of social dynam-
ics. In contrast, information derived from context and perceived
intentionality guide not only social interactions in our daily lives,
but also influence UG decisions (Blount, 1995; Falk et al., 2003,
2008; Gürog˘lu et al., 2009; Radke et al., 2012).
Interestingly, a recent finding revealed that offenders with
psychopathy rate accidents as more morally permissible than
delinquents without psychopathy (Young et al., 2012). This incli-
nation suggests that they might weight the intention behind an
action greater than its (harmful) outcome, stemming from the
deficit of generating an emotional response to the victim’s suf-
fering (Young et al., 2012). It remains open, however, in how far
this partiality in moral judgments might also apply to imbalanced
decision-making. Of note, in laboratory settings, moral judg-
ments are made from a detached perspective as the situation to be
judged remains hypothetical, even when probed by a “would you
do . . . in order to . . . ?” question. Therefore, both the implemen-
tation of one’s choice and the absence vs. presence of self-interest
are important methodological distinctions between the use of
hypothetical scenarios and socioeconomic games. Whereas the
former usually depict vignettes or actions that do not affect one-
self, economic games traditionally involve real, to-be-paid-out
stakes and thus outcomes relevant to oneself and one’s interaction
partner.
Using a modified UG enables us to investigate how social
decisions involving fairness considerations are resolved. In this
version, information is provided about an unselected alternative,
thereby establishing the “context” in which an offer is selected,
and about the intentionality of an offer. From a fixed set of two
allocations of 10 coins, either the first player (proposer) himself
or the computer randomly chooses one. The fixed set allows to
manipulate the reference point (“context”) of the proposal (Falk
et al., 2003; Gürog˘lu et al., 2009; Radke et al., 2012), whereas the
agency of the proposer constitutes the manipulation of intention-
ality, i.e., whether the offer was selected by proposers themselves
vs. by the computer (Radke et al., 2012). This setup allows to
investigate perspective-taking from the side of responders. Here,
of particular interest are unfair proposals (8 coins for the pro-
poser and 2 coins for the responder) that are contrasted against
either fair, hyperfair, or hyperunfair alternatives, or no alterna-
tive at all. Previous findings show that unfair offers are more
often rejected when the alternative was fair compared to all other
three alternatives (Falk et al., 2003; Gürog˘lu et al., 2009; Radke
et al., 2012), which has also been associated with developmental
advances in cognitive perspective-taking abilities (Gürog˘lu et al.,
2009). In adults, a similar rejection pattern was evident for inten-
tional and unintentional decisions (Radke et al., 2012). However,
intentionality played a crucial role in the decision process when
an unfair treatment was made explicit and salient, i.e., when
paired with a fair alternative: These unfair offers were more often
rejected when the offer was selected by proposers themselves than
when selected by the computer, underlining the importance of
punishing intentional social norm violations (Radke et al., 2012).
The current study is the first to investigate social decision-
making based on different aspects of fairness considerations and
their (social-) cognitive demands (Radke et al., 2012) in a forensic
sample. The behavior of offenders with psychopathy was com-
pared to a group of offenders without psychopathy and a group
of healthy controls. For healthy individuals, we expected to repli-
cate previous findings on the effects of context referring to the
manipulation of alternative offers as in (Gürog˘lu et al., 2009;
Radke et al., 2012) and intentionality (Radke et al., 2012). As
these features of social decision-making have not been assessed
in our populations of interest until now, it is difficult to predict
the rejection patterns in the offender groups.
Based on studies pointing to a relative integrity of cogni-
tive functioning in psychopathy as opposed to non-psychopathy
(Morgan and Lilienfeld, 2000; Gao and Raine, 2009; Brazil et al.,
2012), one might expect the group with psychopathy to take
the context or the intentionality of an offer into account. On
the contrary, offenders without psychopathy might show a more
impulsive behavioral pattern, not differentiating on the basis of
additional information. In sum, we aimed to investigate to what
extent the alterations in moral judgments in psychopathy and




The offender groups were recruited from the patient population
of the Pompestichting Forensic Psychiatric Institute in Nijmegen,
The Netherlands 1. The study was approved by the local medi-
cal ethics committee and in accordance with the Declaration of
1The Pompestichting is a “TBS-clinic” located in Nijmegen. TBS is a dis-
posal to be treated, on behalf of the state, for people who committed serious
criminal offences in connection with having a mental disorder. TBS is not
a punishment, but an entrustment act for mentally disordered offenders
(diminished responsibility). These court orders are an alternative to either
long-term imprisonment or confinement in psychiatric hospital, with the goal
to strike a balance between security, treatment, and protection.
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Helsinki. All participants received written information about the
experiment and gave written informed consent.
All participants were male. The group with psychopathy con-
sisted of 18 offenders, the forensic group without psychopathy
consisted of 14 offenders and the control group comprised 18
healthy volunteers without criminal records or a history of psy-
chiatric disorders whowere recruited through advertisements and
matched with the delinquents on age and intelligence (see Table 1
for characteristics of the study population). The Psychopathy
Checklist-Revised (PCL-R; Hare, 2003) was used to assess psy-
chopathy. The PCL-R is an instrument that allows the assessment
of psychopathy through a semi structured interview and infor-
mation on criminal history (Hare, 2003), and is regarded as the
golden standard for the assessment of clinical psychopathy. The
instrument consists of 20 items capturing behavioral correlates of
core aspects of psychopathy, which are coded as either not present
(0), moderately present (1), or certainly present (2). Certified psy-
chologists administered the PCL-R after placement in the Dutch
forensic mental health system and for the present study the PCL-
R scores were retrieved from offenders’ files. As common in
European countries, participants with a score of 26 or more were
included in the group with psychopathy and participants with
a score below 26 were assigned to the non-psychopathy group
(Hildebrand et al., 2004). As healthy controls did not have crim-
inal records, is was not possible to obtain reliable PCL-R scores
in this group. Exclusion criteria were assessed with the Dutch
version of Mini International Neuropsychiatric Interview Plus
5.0.0. (Van Vliet et al., 2000) and Structured Clinical Interview
for DSM-IVAxis II Personality Disorders (Weertman et al., 2000)
and included all major Axis I and Axis II disorders (except anti-
social personality disorder in the offender groups) or any CNS
injuries (Brazil et al., 2009, 2011, 2012). Additional information
was retrieved from each offender’s clinical files. An estimation of
intelligence level was made for all participants by using the Dutch
version of the Adult Reading Test (NLV; Schmand et al., 1991). All
assessments were carried out by trained psychologists.
DESIGN
Participants were responders in a computerized version of the
modified UG with two within-subject factors: Intentionality and
Context. Intentionality had two levels based on who selects
the offer: the human player (i.e., the proposer) him/herself
(intentional) or the computer (unintentional). Intentionality was
thus manipulated in a binary fashion. Context had four levels
based on alternatives to an unfair distribution (8:2): a fair-
alternative (5:5 vs. 8:2), a hyperfair-alternative (2:8 vs. 8:2), a
Table 1 | Sociodemographic and clinical characteristics of study
participants (mean [SD]).
PP (N = 18) Non-PP (N = 14) HC (N = 18) p-value
Age in years 42.5 (6.7) 39.7 (7.7) 37.4 (8.8) 0.15
PCL-R 31.0 (3.6) 15.8 (5.1) n/a 0.00*
PP, offenders with psychopathy; non-PP, offenders without psychopathy; HC,
healthy controls. *significant difference between PP and non-PP.
hyperunfair-alternative (10:0 vs. 8:2), and no-alternative (8:2 vs.
8:2). Hence, the factor Context pertains to the alternative out-
come that had not been chosen. Pitting an unfair offer (8:2)
against a fair alternative (5:5) can be seen as an explicit version
of the classic UG in which decision-making is generally based
on comparing any offer to a potential equal split. The resulting
8 conditions were presented 16 times each (counterbalanced for
proposers’ gender and position of the unfair offer). As the no-
alternative condition entails an 8:2 offer for either alternative, an
unfair offer (8:2) was presented in 5 of the 8 conditions, equiv-
alent to 80 trials. The three genuine alternative offers (i.e., 5:5,
2:8, or 10:0) were selected on 48 trials, yielding 128 trials in total.
Contrary to subjects’ belief, all choices were computer-generated.
MATERIAL
Figure 1 depicts the timeline of a trial in the intentional fair-
alternative condition. Each round started with a fixation cross
(1000ms), followed by the presentation of the two available
options (1000ms). Next, the selected offer was surrounded by a
red square (1000ms). Subsequently, “Yes” and “No” buttons were
presented while the selection remained visible. As the task was
self-paced, participants had unlimited amount of time to respond
via pressing one of two buttons using the keyboard. Participants’
response remained on the screen for 2000ms before the next
round started.
PROCEDURE
Participants were led to believe that they were coupled with data
from others who had previously participated as proposers and
that they would play every trial with a new partner (Gürog˘lu et al.,
2009; Radke et al., 2012). They were told that on some trials the
other players would make an offer themselves and on other tri-
als the computer would take over and randomly select one of the
two options. Participants’ task was to decide whether to accept
or reject an offer. If accepted, the coins were distributed as pro-
posed; if rejected, neither player received anything. Participants
were informed that at the end of the experiment, a random num-
ber of rounds would be selected to determine their payoff. This
was done to assure participants’ motivation and to strengthen
the concept of a one-shot game as every round could influence
their financial outcome. Moreover, it was emphasized that partic-
ipants’ decisions also affected the other players’ outcome because
their payoff would be determined by participants’ response, irre-
spective of who made the proposal in a particular round (i.e.,
themselves vs. computer). Proposers would be paid after all data
from responders had been collected. The payoff was set around 5
Euro (± 5 cent) to manage an equal payment for all participants,
but simultaneously minimize suspicion.
STATISTICAL ANALYSES
Rejection rates of unfair offers were entered into a repeated
measures ANOVA with Intentionality (two levels: intentional
vs. unintentional) and Context (four levels: fair vs. hyperfair
vs. hyperunfair vs. no alternative) as within-subject factors and
Group (three levels: offenders with psychopathy, offenders with-
out psychopathy, healthy controls) as a between-subject factor. In
case of interactions involving the factor Group, separate ANOVAs
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FIGURE 1 | Display of a trial in the intentional fair-alternative condition.
The name of the proposer is shown at the top (here “Proposer”) and the
name of the participant is shown underneath (here “You”). The two potential
distributions are specified by red and blue coins (red for proposer, blue for
responder), with the offer selected by the proposer encircled in red.
Participants have to indicate via button press whether to accept (“Yes”) or
reject (“No”) the offer. Note that for unintentional offers (not shown here),
the otherwise black silhouette of the proposer was purple with a banner
displaying “Computer chooses,” which was also depicted instead of the
proposer’s name.
for the three different groups are conducted with the above
mentioned within-subject factors.
In order to test for replicating the results of Radke et al. (2012),
i.e., higher rejection rates for unfair offers paired with a fair alter-
native when the offer was selected by proposers themselves than
when selected by the computer, the effect of intentionality will be
tested in the fair-alternative context on the whole group level by
means of a repeated measures ANOVA with Intentionality (two
levels: intentional vs. unintentional) as a within-subject factor.
RESULTS
There were significant main effects of Context, F(3, 141) =
16.49, p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.26, and Intentionality, F(1, 47) =
4.95, p = 0.03, partial η2 = 0.10. Moreover, the interaction
between Context and Group was significant, F(6, 141) = 3.58, p =
0.01, partial η2 = 0.13. None of the interactions involving the
within-subject factor Intentionality (Intentionality × Context,
Intentionality × Group, Intentionality × Context × Group) was
significant (all ps > 0.27) nor was the main effect of Group
(p = 0.98).
Pairwise comparisons revealed that rejection rates were highest
for the fair-alternative condition (63.3%) compared to the more
disadvantageous alternatives (no-alternative: 41.8%, p = 0.001;
hyperunfair: 39.1%, p < 0.001). Rejection rates for the hyperfair
alternative condition (53.8%) were higher than for the hyperun-
fair and no-alternative condition (both ps = 0.001). The latter
two conditions did not differ significantly (p = 1).With respect to
the main effect of intentionality, rejection rates were higher when
the offer was selected intentionally (52.2%) than when selected
unintentionally/by the computer (49.2%).
To investigate the Context × Group interaction, separate
analyses for the three different groups were conducted (see
Figures 2, 3). There was a significant effect of Context in healthy
controls, F(3, 51) = 14.03, p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.45, as well
as in the forensic sample with psychopathy, F(3, 51) = 3.96,
FIGURE 2 | Rejection rates of intentional unfair offers with regard to
alternative offers and group.Mean percentage and standard errors of
rejection of 8:2-offers are displayed. PP, offenders with psychopathy;
non-PP, offenders without psychopathy; HC, healthy controls.
p = 0.039, partial η2 = 0.19, but not in offenders without psy-
chopathy, F(3, 39) = 1.63, p = 0.27, partial η2 = 0.10. For the
healthy controls, the same pattern as on the whole-group level
was evident: rejection rates were highest for the fair-alternative
condition (72.2%) compared to the more disadvantageous alter-
natives (no-alternative: 36.7%, p < 0.001; hyperunfair: 28.5%,
p = 0.001). Rejection rates for the hyperfair alternative condition
(67.7%) were higher than for the hyperunfair and no-alternative
condition (both ps < 0.002), with the latter two not differ-
ing significantly (p = 0.15). Reactions to the fair and hyperfair
alternative conditions did not differ (p = 0.48). For the forensic
sample with psychopathy, rejection rates were highest for the fair-
alternative condition (60.7%) compared to the more disadvanta-
geous alternatives (no-alternative: 45.1%, p = 0.03; hyperunfair:
43.9%, p = 0.02). The remaining pairwise comparisons did not
yield significant differences (p > 0.08).
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org July 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 406 | 4
Radke et al. Fairness considerations in psychopathy
In order to directly test for replication of Radke et al. (2012),
analysis of the fair alternative condition indicated higher rejection
rates for intentional (66.8%) vs. unintentional/computer offers
(59.8%), F(1, 47) = 6.78, p = 0.01, partial η2 = 0.13. In contrast,
the effect of Intentionality did not reach significance for the other
three contexts (all Fs< 0.69, all ps > 0.41; see also Figure 4).
DISCUSSION
In the current study, social decision-making based on different
aspects of fairness considerations was investigated in a forensic
sample and a matched healthy control group. In particular, we
sought to explore in how far altered moral judgments in psy-
chopathy apply to decisions when not only moral values, but also
self-relevant outcomes are at stake.
In addition to replicating previous findings on context and
intentionality (Falk et al., 2003; Gürog˘lu et al., 2009; Radke
et al., 2012), group differences in context sensitivity were evident.
Essentially, offenders with psychopathy displayed a similar pat-
tern of rejection behavior to that of healthy individuals, i.e., an
effect of context. In contrast, the decisions in delinquents with-
out psychopathy were not influenced by the alternative offer to an
unfair proposal.
FIGURE 3 | Rejection rates of unintentional unfair offers with regard to
alternative offers and group. Mean percentage and standard errors of
rejection of 8:2-offers are displayed. PP, offenders with psychopathy;
non-PP, offenders without psychopathy; HC, healthy controls.
FIGURE 4 | Difference between intentional and unintentional unfair
offers with regard to alternative offers and group. Mean percentage and
standard errors of rejection of 8:2-offers are displayed. PP, offenders with
psychopathy; non-PP, offenders without psychopathy; HC, healthy controls.
Recently, there has been some disagreement on which pro-
cesses in fairness considerations are targeted by the context
manipulation, i.e., higher-order social functions like perspective-
taking (Falk et al., 2003; Gürog˘lu et al., 2009) or straightforward
outcome comparisons (Brandts and Sola, 2001; Sandbu, 2007).
This discussion (see also Radke et al., 2012) is crucial with regard
to drawing inferences about possible impaired and preserved
(social-) cognitive abilities in psychiatric/forensic populations.
Although both processes rely on counterfactual thinking, i.e.,
representations of alternatives to past events (Roese, 1997), the
representation of another, social agent is not necessary for com-
paring the outcomes for the self-resulting from the chosen and
the unchosen alternative. Such a quantitative evaluation can be
achieved—quite parsimoniously—without taking the perspec-
tive of another person. Our design resolves this disagreement by
making the social dimension explicit, i.e., contrasting intentional
and unintentional offers. The processes of outcome comparisons
and intentionality considerations can thereby easily be disentan-
gled. Importantly, the current data replicates previous findings
on their relative contribution to social decision-making (Radke
et al., 2012), which provides a solid basis for the investigation of
intergroup variations.
As delinquents without psychopathy did not adjust their
behavior to the context or intentionality of an offer, their deci-
sions might be dominated by rather basic motives not directly
targeted by these manipulations. Given that their overall mean
rejection rate did not differ from the other groups either, the
offenders without psychopathy seem to be guided by the mag-
nitude of the proposal’s intrinsic distribution (what the proposer
gets vs. what the responder gets) with a dislike of unequal out-
comes, i.e., inequity aversion. Fairness is determined by payoffs
available in the here and now, which may reflect the preference
for immediate options, hinting at a hyperactivity of the impulsive
system (Buckholtz et al., 2010; Dean et al., 2013).
Offenders with psychopathy, on the other hand, behaved sim-
ilarly to healthy volunteers. The lack of differences in overall
rejection rates compared to both healthy and incarcerated indi-
viduals is in line with the behavioral results of Vieira et al.
(2013), but at odds with other earlier, yet inconsistent, findings on
altered responder behavior in the UG reporting higher (Koenigs
et al., 2010), and lower rejection rates (Osumi and Ohira, 2010),
respectively. These studies, however, also diverge in sample char-
acteristics, with the group being either very small [N = 6 for
high anxious psychopaths, (Koenigs et al., 2010)] or consisting
of students (Osumi and Ohira, 2010) or a community sample
(Vieira et al., 2013), warranting caution for generalization to a
large forensic population. The main focus of the current study,
however, lay not on rejection rates as such, but on its modulation
by context and intentionality.
Most interestingly therefore, in the current sample, individuals
with psychopathy showed an analogous sensitivity to the alterna-
tives to a given outcome, which converges with findings on intact
moral judgments (Blair et al., 1995; Cima et al., 2010; Aharoni
et al., 2012), Theory of Mind (Blair et al., 1996; Richell et al.,
2003) and other aspects of cognitive functioning (Blair et al., 2006;
Brazil et al., 2012). Despite the behavioral similarity with healthy
controls, in psychopathy the underlying mechanisms might differ
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and reflect a distinct motivation. For instance, in healthy indi-
viduals with psychopathic traits, rejection of unfair offers was
associated with increased activation in the anterior cingulate cor-
tex and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Vieira et al., 2013). The
recruitment of these clusters might indicate impairments in auto-
matic emotion regulation, leading to anger-motivated instead of
fairness-motivated rejection (Vieira et al., 2013).
Conversely, we observed behavioral differences in the context-
dependency of rejection decisions between offenders with
psychopathy compared to offenders without psychopathy. This
differentiation between subgroups of violent offenders might be
attributable to the cognitive nature of the task, i.e., its assess-
ment of cognitive perspective-taking (Gürog˘lu et al., 2009).
Previous research suggests relatively intact cognitive function-
ing in psychopathy, but shortages in non-psychopathy (Morgan
and Lilienfeld, 2000; Gao and Raine, 2009; Brazil et al., 2012).
Moreover, in contrast to emotional aspects of empathy, making
inferences about others’ mental states, i.e., mentalizing or cog-
nitive inferences, does not seem to be compromised in clinical
psychopathy (Blair et al., 1996; Cima et al., 2010; Shamay-Tsoory
et al., 2010).
Along these lines, other (than financial) self-serving moti-
vations supported by mentalizing might underlie the different
decision patterns between offenders with psychopathy and those
without. While both groups show an increased risk for frustration
(Blair, 2010), individuals with psychopathy might be more suc-
cessful in cognitively regulating impulsive tendencies and possibly
even use a “fair” disguise instrumentally in order to obtain unob-
trusive advantages, e.g., the appreciation of the experimenter. One
might also speculate in how far the initial emotional responses to
unfairness differ between the forensic groups. Both might react
equally fervently to potentially frustrating unfair offers, but base
their decisions on other features, leading to the distinct behav-
ioral patterns. Future studies assessing physiological indicators of
emotional reactivity, such as skin conductance, would be useful to
explore in how far initial, affective reactions might be restrained
by cognitive mechanisms of control or impression management.
More tailored paradigms could also identify effects of impulsivity
or serial decisions.
With regard to the relative weighting of the intention behind
an action and its outcome in offenders with psychopathy (Young
et al., 2012), the current data does not allow for drawing firm
conclusions on the influence of intentionality for the subgroup
of offenders with psychopathy. Its effects manifested only on the
whole-group level, which precludes further investigation for the
groups separately. Likewise, in contrast to the study by Young et al.
(2012) who used hypothetical scenarios in which negative out-
comes meant harm or death of another person, even the worst
consequences in the current design were, naturally due to the
implementation of choices, much less severe. Besides, they did not
imply positive punishment, i.e., harm, but negative punishment,
i.e., the withholding of coins in the case of an rejection decision
and thereby forgoing potential gain. Despite the methodological
strength of executing the choices in an interactive setting, this
approach is less likely to trigger empathetic reactions, also since
in UG settings, the most pronounced emotions arise in respon-
ders facing unfairness (Pillutla and Murnighan, 1996; Xiao and
Houser, 2005).
In sum, our findings indicate discrepancies between the two
offender samples: On the one hand, offenders without psychopa-
thy seem to neglect aspects of fairness considerations that go
beyond the comparisons based on payoffs, whereas, on the other
hand, the decisions of offenders with psychopathy did not differ
from those of healthy individuals. Distinct processes in cog-
nition and affect might underlie these behavioral similarities.
Importantly, central features of psychopathy, i.e., manipulating or
deceiving others, require certain knowledge about social rules as
well as cognitively taking the perspective of others, so that offend-
ers with psychopathy might succeed in an environment where all
possible outcome variants, intentions, self- and other-interests are
explicitly stated. In contrast, real-life interactions with others are
not only more complex and subtle, but also require emotional
skills, such as generating empathic responses, regulating one’s
emotions, and adequately reacting to others’ feelings, that are
likely to be impaired in psychopathy, as evident in their antisocial
lifestyles and violent crimes.
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